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LEGAL BOUNDARIES OF AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL-STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATIVE
PURPOSE AND TECHNIQUES
LAwtENCE W. POLLACK*
The Air Quality Act of 19671 has once again directed the nation's attention to
the dangers of ever-increasing levels of air pollution. The new legislation, while
increasing the role of the federal government, did not change the basic congressional
findings of the 1963 Clean Air Act "that the prevention and control of air pollution
at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments."'
One of the designated purposes for the passage of the 1963 act was:
to provide technical and financial assistance to State and local governments in con-
nection with the development and execution of their air pollution prevention and
control programs.3
States and local governments have been attempting to "prevent and control" air
pollution for many years. As might be anticipated, the major industrial cities were
the first to enact legislation on the subject. The recognizable increase in the problem
and the increase in scientific knowledge about the problem have gradually led to the
adoption of prevention and control legislation employing various and multiple tech-
niques of regulation and enforcement. Among these techniques are limitations on
the density and opacity of visible smoke, limitations on specific emissions, regulatory
permits and requirements for installation and operation of equipment, limitations
upon the kind and nature of fuels permitted, skill requirements and training for
equipment operators, and the flat prohibition of certain industrial activities. These
various techniques are directly related to the local function of "prevention and control
of air pollution at its source."5
Enforcement of state and local statutes over the years has provided sufficient legal
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'81 Stat. 485 (1967).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (1964).
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'General smoke ordinances were adopted by Chicago in April i88i; Cincinnati in November i88s;
St. Louis in 1893; City of Brooklyn in 1895; and New York City in 1898. Statutory limitations on the
use of various coals date back at least to the years 1273 and 13o6 in England. See Kennedy & Porter,
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5 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (1964).
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experience to permit definition of some of the legal boundaries confronting new
legislative attempts to deal with a problem that has proved stubborn indeed.
The Air Quality Act of i967 is a reflection of a relatively new legislative approach.
This approach, an outgrowth of modern "systems analysis" and computer tech-
nology, has been developed and advocated by the U.S. Public Health Service as
a program of "Air Resource Management."6  Since the Public Health Service is
the most influential governmental organization in the field, its recommended legis-
lation has had considerable influence upon new state and local legislation. The
"Air Resource Management" concept was explained in a recent Public Health Service
publication as follows:
The air is a matter of public business, calling for good management practices.
The public must have knowledge of air quality, effects of air pollutants, and the
types and qualities of pollutants put into the air. Armed with this knowledge,
the public depends on its governmental organizations to establish air quality goals
and standards, and to develop the program goals, air-use plans, and action programs
needed to reach the desired air quality. Simply stated, the public embarks on an
air resource management program to assure sound community growth in which the
air resources of the air pollution basin are put to optimum use.7
A legislative purpose of "good management so that air resources are put to optimum
use" contrasts sharply with the more traditional "public health and welfare" legis-
lative purposes.8
The purpose of this article is to review the legal experiences encountered in the
development of the various state and local legislative techniques, so that future legis-
lative efforts can be judged and guided accordingly. Because recent New York City
legislation employs most of the available legislative techniques, it is used throughout
this article as an example of "source control" legislation? The ordinance provisions
recommended by the Public Health Service are hereinafter used as a model of "Air
Resource Management" legislation.' °
'Hearings on S. 78o Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, goth Cong., ist Sess., pt. 2, at 958-77 (x967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 78o];
Larson, Determining Reduced-Emission Goals Needed to Achieve Air Quality Goals-A Hypothetical
Case, 17 J. Am POLL. CONrioL As'N 823-29 (1967).
'A PROPOSAL FOR AN AIR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, VOL. VIII, PHASE II PRO;ECT REPORT,
ST. Louis METROPOLITAN AREA INTERsTAT AIR POLLUTiON SruD 3 (National Center for Air Pollu-
tion Control, May 1967) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC H ALTH SERVICE MANAGEMENT PROGR.Am]. (Em-
phasis added.)
'N.Y. CiTy ADMIN. CoDE §892-1.0 (1963). See also 42 U.S.C. § I857(a)(2) (1964).
'New York City Local Law No. 14 of x966, N.Y. CiTy ADMIN. CODE §5 892-1.0 et seq. (Supp.
1967). Local Law No. 14 of 1966 and the two New York City Council Special Committee Reports which
were the basis for the law are reprinted in full in Hearings on S. 78o, Pt. 3, at 1482-1622 (1967). The
New York City law is administered by the N.Y.C. Dep't of Air Pollution Control, an administrative
agency headed by a Commissioner appointed by the Mayor. The Department promulgates regulations,
hereinafter cited as "A.P.C. § -"
'oPUBLiC HEALTH SERviCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 89-132.
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I
THE POLICE POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
A. Background-The Law of Nuisance
Most of the early law involving air pollution was a part of the common law tort
of "nuisance" and the confusion associated with that word has been carried forward
regularly to modern air pollution control. Dean William Prosser has commented
that "[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that
which surrounds the word 'nuisance.'" 11
While this paper cannot hope to clear a scholarly path through the "jungle," a
summary of common law concepts of the law of nuisance is necessary to an analysis of
air pollution control legislation.
The law of nuisance has been divided into "private nuisance" and "public
nuisance' since ancient times." Private nuisance is simply a traditional tort which
lies for interference with a person's enjoyment of his property. The action is
dependent upon proof of damage and a finding that the defendant's activity is
"unreasonable." Since most private nuisance cases involving air pollution requested
an injunction, the standard flexible powers of an equity court combined with the
required determination of "reasonableness" to develop a judicial policy of balancing
the harm to the plaintiff against any usefulness of the defendant's conduct. As
explained in Cogswell v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.:'3
The compromises exacted by the necessities of the social state, and the fact that
some inconvenience to others must by necessity often attend the ordinary use of
property, without permitting which there could in many cases be no valuable
use at all, have compelled the recognition, in all systems of jurisprudence, of the
principle that each member of society must submit to annoyances consequent upon
the ordinary and common use of property, provided such use is reasonable both as
respects the owner of the property, and those immediately affected by the use,
in view of time, place and other circumstances.
When the difficulties of proving damages from air pollution are balanced against
the usual economic importance of the accused factory, the plaintiff's obstacles are
obvious. The wide judicial discretion exercised in private nuisance cases has allowed
pollution from fifty coke ovens to be classified as only a "petty annoyance" to a
neighboring home owner and a conclusion that air pollution is "indispensable to
progress."'14
11 W. PRossER, LAW Op TORTS 592 (3 d ed. 1964).
123 BLAcxsroNa, COMMEUTAIs 215 (i6th ed. 1825). The law of nuisance and other remedies
available to private citizens is exhaustively discussed in juergensmeye:, Control of Air Pollution Through
the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUsE L.J. i26.
is 103 N.Y. IO, 13-14 (1886). The court held that even the careful maintenance of a railroad
engine-house next to the plaintiff's house was beyond the line of reason, especially in view of an un-
disputed finding of fact that pIaintifls son had been made ill by smoke and dust.
"Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 142 Misc. 329, 254 N.Y.S. 403 (I93I), afl'd mer., 236 App.
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The law of "public nuisance," however, involves damage to the community in
the exercise of its common rights. Any such activity was a common law crime. The
conducting of an offensive smelling business, for example, was among the early
accepted species of public nuisance.15 Smoke, as distinguished from many other
activities injurious to public health, was not considered to be a "nuisance per se,"10
and proof that a large number of persons actually suffered some impairment to their
enjoyment of life was required for prosecution for the creation of a public nuisance.
The restrictions of the law of public nuisance caused by the damage proving
requirements gave rise to two developments: courts began to find damage to the
public by taking "judicial notice" that impure air was harmful, and legislatures
declared dense smoke a public nuisance as a matter of law. Often, "judicial notice"
of damage was used as a basis for upholding the legislation.17 Unless the nuisance
statute is carefully drafted, however, actual proof of harm might still be required.
The state of New Jersey did not surmount this hurdle until 1950.18
Modern health requirements and modern air pollution control are concerned with
invisible and odorless gases such as carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide, with minute
particles invisible to the naked eye, and with the complex chemical reactions that
create photochemical smog. For the most part, increasing pollution levels result
from the combined atmospheric contribution of thousands of installations and auto-
mobiles. No single identifiable source may be large enough or visible enough to be
held responsible for specific damage. As a result, the laws of public and private
nuisance have little application in the routine enforcement of modern air pollution
legislation.
In Leone v. Paris,"9 the court enforced designated water pollution control stan-
dards although the defendant's pollution contribution alone did not prevent the
water from being usable and the stream involved had not been classified as "polluted."
The court held:
If there is a substantial threat to the community it need not be hoveringly cur-
rent .... The indirect, impersonal specter of menace created here, without sub.
stance to most at this instant in time, is nevertheless real and escalating, to be
stunningly present in due time.20
Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932). Some twenty years later, the City of Buffalo was still having air
pollution difficulties with the same factory and, like the neighbor, having little success. See People v.
Savage, I Misc. 2d 337, 148 N.Y.S.2d xi1, afl'd meim., 309 N.Y. 941, 32 N.E.2d 313 (x955).
ir4 BLACIeTONE, COMMENTARIES 168 (i6th ed. 1825).
"
6 See Dep't of Health v. Philip & William Ebling Brewery Co., 38 Misc. 537, 78 N.Y.S. 13 (1902).
"' City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., 599 N.Y. 207 (910); State v. Tower, 185 Mo.
79, 84 SYV. 10 (1904); Bowers v. City of Indianapolis, 169 Ind. io5, 8z N.E. 1097 (1907). Cl. People
v. New York Edison Co., 159 App. Div. 786, 144 N.Y.S. 707 (1913).
'Board of Health v. New York Central R.R., 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d 511 (195o); see Cowan, Air
Pollution Control in New Jersey, 9 Ruroans L. REv. 6o (1955).
19 43 Misc. 2d 442, 251 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1964), modified, 25 App. Div. 2d 508, 261 N.Y.S.2d 656
(x965).
"0 Id. at 447, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 282-83. (Emphasis in original.)
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The late Chief Judge Vanderbilt of New Jersey, directly contrasting the in-
adequacies of the law of public nuisance with the need for effective air pollution
control, held:
The reason for a municipality making unlawful the emission of smoke is readily
apparent. The issuance of dense smoke from a single chimney, in and of itself, may
be altogether harmless and cause no inconvenience or damage to the public, but if
smoke of like density issued from hundreds of chimneys, the contamination of the
atmosphere would be substantial and the injury to the public considerable, yet for
lack of the requisite elements of a public nuisance at common law, the municipality
could obtain no relief by way of indictment. Ordinances making unlawful the
emission of smoke are therefore obviously necessary and reasonable and a valid
exercise of the local police power2 l
The conclusion seems inescapable. Modern air pollution control legislation,
based upon the need for protection of the public health, must be recognized as in-
dependent of the elements of common law nuisance. It is an exercise of legislative
police powers and must be judged in accordance with the constitutional standards
applicable to those powers. In i96o, the Supreme Court, referring to Detroit's air
pollution law, declared:
The ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose of promoting the health and
welfare of the city's inhabitants. Legislation designed to free from pollution the
very air that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most
traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power.
s2
B. The Due Process Clause
Recognition that air pollution control legislation is within the proper framework
of an exercise of the police power has become standard. 3 The police power is, of
course, limited by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.24 The question in any analysis of air pollution control legislation is
whether the statute is within the limits imposed by the Constitution.
The leading case outlining the constitutional boundaries of air pollution control
legislation is Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines.5  That 1916 case involved a
"1 Board of Health v. New York Central R.R., 1o N.J. 294, 306, go A.2d 729, 735 (1952).
2 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (ig6o).
"City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., igg N.Y. 207 (igo); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Murtagh, 280 App. Div. 221, 112 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1952); People v. Bevevino, 202 Misc. 723, 112 N.Y.S.2d
647 (1952); People v. Tatje, 203 Misc. 949, 121 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1953); West Bronx Auto Paint Shop,
Inc. v. City of New York, 33 Misc. 2d 29, 223 N.Y.S.2d 984 (ig6i), af'd nerm., 1[7 App. Div. 2d 772,
232 N.Y.S.2d 3931 (1962), modified, 13 N.Y.2d 730, 241 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1963). See also City of Utica
v. Water Pollution Control Board, 5 N.Y.2d 164, 156 N.E.ad 301, 182 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1959).
"' "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously
the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
23 239 U.S. 486 (i9t6).
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challenge to an ordinance similar in many respects to modern control legislation.
The ordinance established smoke density limitations measured according to the
Ringelimann Smoke Chart2 and forbade remodeling of new construction without
a permit. The standard of efficiency called for by the smoke limitations required,
as a practical matter, the remodeling of almost all of the furnaces in operation at
the time of the adoption of the ordinance. The law was challenged as violative of
both the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court held:
So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, we have no doubt the State may
by itself or through authorized municipalities declare the emission of dense smoke
in cities or populous neighborhoods a nuisance and subject to restraint as such; and
that the harshness of such legislation, or its effect upon business interests, short
of a merely arbitrary enactment, are not valid constitutional objections. Nor is
there any valid Federal constitutional objection in the fact that the regulation may
require the discontinuance of the use of property or subject the occupant to large
expense in complying with the terms of the law or ordinance.27
Generally stated, the limitations imposed by the due process clause upon the
legislative power to protect the public health are that the exercise of power must not
be arbitrary and must not go beyond what is necessary to accomplish the legislative
purpose.2 s Since the opposite of "arbitrary" is "reasonable," it has become common
judicial practice to determine the constitutional inquiry on the basis of whether the
legislation is "reasonable" or "unreasonable.""m The use of that word in private nui-
sance cases as an indication of judicial flexibility80 has led to confusion when the same
word is used in a constitutional inquiryY' Where there is a legitimate public purpose
"
6 The Ringelman Smoke Chart, published by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, is commonly established by
statutes as the recognized smoke measurement guide. Its use has been sustained by the courts. See
People v. International Steel Corp., xo2 Cal. App. 2d 935, 226 P.2d 587 (195x); State v. Mundet Cork
Corp., 8 N.J. 359, 86 A.2d z, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 8I9 (1952); People v. Plywood Mfr's of Cal., 137
Cal. App. 2d 859, 291 P.2d 587 (1955); Sittner v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 834, 384 P.2d 859 (1963);
People v. Murray, 174 Misc. 251, i9 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1940). For New York City regulations, see A.P.C.
Reg. § 9.03.
"'Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 491-92 (1916).
"Lawtoi v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486
(1916); People v. Arlen Service Stations, 284 N.Y. 340 (1940); Sheafer v. Joseph Breen, Inc., 263
App. Div. 135, 31 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1941) •
"People v. New York Edison Co., x59 App. Div. 786, 144 N.Y.S. 707 (0913); People v. Cunard
White Star, Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413 (1939); Health Dep't v. The Rector, etc. of Trinity Church, 145 N.Y.
32 (1895).
"'See cases cited in notes 13, 14 supra.
" See People v. New York Edison Co., 159 App. Div. 786, 144 N.Y.S. 707 (1913); People v. Cunard
White Star, Ltd., 28o N.Y. 413 (1939); People v. Peterson, 31 Misc. 2d 738, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1961);
People v. Oswald, I Misc. 2d 726, 116 N.Y.S.2d 5o (1952); People v. Savage, i Misc. 2d 337, 148 N.Y.S.ad
191, aff'd Iner., 309 N.Y. 941, 132 N.E.2d 313 (x955); People v. New York Central & H.R.R., 159
App. Div. 329, 144 N.Y.S. 699 (913); Dep't of Health v. Philip & William Ebling Brewery Co., 38
Misc. 537, 78 N.Y.S. 13 (1902) (cases applying a judicial "rule of reason") and Dankner v. City of
New York, 20 Misc. 2d 557, 194 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959); Engelshar v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y.2d 370, 157 N.E.2d
626, 184 N.Y.S.2d 640, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959); Health Dep't v. The Rector, etc. of Trinity
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and the legislation is related to its accomplishment, it is inappropriate for a court
to "balance" the economic equities of the situation. Where the legislative purpose
clearly is the protection of the public health, judicial restraint and the presumption of
legislative constitutionality32 must be the guide. Police power legislation has been
referred to as the governmental power that is the least limitable by the courtsp
There can be no doubt that these general constitutional principles apply to air
pollution control legislation. The New York Court of Appeals stated in City of
Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co.:3
4
The common council is thus the judge as to what ordinances it will pass for
the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the city and the protection and security
of their property, and unless an ordinance passed by it is wholly arbitrary and un-
reasonable it should be upheld. The necessity and advisability of the ordinance is for
the legislative power to determine. The presumption is in favor of the ordinance.
The Missouri Supreme Court, deciding the constitutionality of the St. Louis air
pollution law in the case of Ballentine v. Nester,3 5 relied upon an earlier case for
the following principle:
"The methods, regulations, and restrictions to be imposed to attain, so far as may
be, results consistent with the public welfare, are purely of legislative cognizance.
The courts have no power to determine the merits of conflicting theories, nor to
declare that a particular method of advancing and protecting the public is
superior or likely to insure greater safety or better protection than others. The
legislative determination of the methods, restrictions, and regulations is final,
except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights of the
citizens."36
It can be concluded therefore that whether the constitutional inquiry is phrased
in terms of "arbitrariness" or "reasonableness," every advantage should be given to
the sustaining of the legislation as long as the statute is related to the control of air
pollution for the public health.
C. The Equal Protection Clause
Police power legislation is also limited by the requirements of equal protection
of the law. The Constitution precludes an arbitrary system of classification or dis-
Church, 145 N.Y. 32 (895) (cases applying a "reasonable cost" element). These cases will be discussed
in detail in subsequent sections of this paper.
12 Wasmuth v. Allen, 14 N.Y.2d 391, 200 N.E.2d 756, 252 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964); Sweeney v. Cannon,
23 App. Div. 2d I, 258 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1965); People v. Bevevino, 202 Misc. 723, 112 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1952).
"Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Engelshar v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y.2d 370, 157
NXE.2d 626, 184 N.Y.S.2d 640, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (I959).
I& 199 N.Y. 207, 211 (1910).
S350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942).
Mid. at 70, 164 S.W.2d at 382, quoting Nelson v. City of Minneapolis, 1x2 Minn. I6, 18, 127 N.W.
445, 447 (1go). For similar conclusions see State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 1x4 Minn. 122, 130
N.W. 545 (1911); Moses v. United States, 16 App. D.C. 428 (i9oo); Penh-Dixie Cement Corp. v. City of
Kingsport, 189 Tenn. 450, 225 S.W.2d 270 (1949); Sitmer v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 834, 384 P.2d 859
(1963).
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crimination between persons of the same classification. Again, however, every effort
will be made by the courts to uphold the legislation. As expressed in the leading
case of Heath & Milligan Co. v. Worst.. 7
We have declared many times, and illustrated the declaration, that classification must
have relation to the purpose of the legislature. But logical appropriateness of the
inclusion or exclusion of objects or persons is not required. A classification may
not be merely arbitrary, but necessarily there must be great freedom of discretion,
even though it results in "ill-advised, unequal and oppressive legislation." [Citation
omitted.] And this necessarily on account of the complex problems which are
presented to government. Evils must be met as they arise and according to the
manner in which they arise. The right remedy may not always be apparent.
Any interference, indeed, may be asserted to be evil, may result in evil. At any
rate, exact wisdom and nice adaptation of remedies are not required by the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor the crudeness nor the impolicy nor even the injustice
of state laws redressed by it.
The cases allow extensive discretion in the establishment of classifications, and
most questions of equal protection raised in challenging modern regulatory legisla-
tion are directed toward the definition of the established classifications0 8 Just as the
decision in an antitrust case becomes predictable once the court has defined the out-
lines of a "relevant market," judicial definition of the limits of each classification will
ultimately control the decision of whether the person affected falls within a certain
class or whether all persons within the given class are treated equally. If the
classification is interpreted as being very wide, i.e., "all fuel burning equipment,"
a statute which treats coal burning equipment differently from oil burning equip-
ment will be held to be discriminatory. If the classifications are interpreted as being
separate and narrow, i.e., "coal burning equipment" and "oil burning equipment,"
the law will invariably be found to provide for the required equal treatment within
each classification.
Equal protection is accomplished when all of the same class are treated in a like
manner... That one class is treated differently than other classes can give rise
to no complaint under the equal protection clause.8 9
The complexities and variations involved in the prevention and control of diversi-
fied sources of air pollution requires, as a practical matter, the creation of numerous
S 207 U.s. 338, 354-55 (1907).
aSee Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 398 (942); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114
Minn. 122, 130 N.W. 545 (1911); City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., 199 N.W. 207
(i9io); Sittner v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 834, 384 P.2d 859 (1963); 7 E. McQUILLAN, MtNICIPAL CRPonA-
TroNs 476 (3d ed. 1949).
s
9 Engelshar v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y.2d 370, 157 N.E.2d 626, 184 N.Y.S.2d 640, cert. denied, 36o U.S. 902
(z959); People v. Arlen Service Stations, 284 N.Y. 340 (1940); Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164
S.W.2d 378 (1942).
LEGAL BOUNDARIES oF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 339
classifications and distinctions. Those classifications must be related to the designated
purpose for the legislation 0
II
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE: PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY VERSUS
EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES
The "Findings and Purposes" section of the federal Act41 contains the foundation
for difficult constitutional questions. While the questions have not yet been raised,
the trend of new legislation toward "Air Resource Management" indicates that the
problems are certain to be raised in the near future. The key congressional "finding"
is cast in the following traditional public health terms:
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought
about by urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor
vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, in-
cluding injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration
of property, and hazards to air and ground transportation .... 42
The enumerated "purpose" clause is as follows:
(i) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population;
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to
achieve the prevention and control of air pollution;
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and local governments
in connection with the development and execution of their air pollution prevention
and control programs ... 43
It is apparent that the legislative draftsmen had two separate and distinct pur-
poses in mind; one being affirmative in concept-"to promote productive capacity"--
and the other being negative in concept--"to prevent and control air pollution."
These distinct purposes are now being reflected in new state and local legislation and
it is fair to conclude that the trend is toward the affirmative purpose of promoting
efficient "Air Resource Management." The city of Chicago is the leading city
employing this concept 4 New York City is the leading city which employs the
"prevention and control" concept 4 Since a comparison of the Chicago Municipal
o City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., I99 N.Y. 207 (i95o); Ballentine v. Nester, 350
Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942).
"Air Quality Act of x967, § ioi, 8i Stat. 485.
"Air Quality Act of 1967, § 1o1(a) (2), 81 Stat. 485.
"Air Quality Act of z967, § ioi(b)(s), (2), (3), 81 Stat. 485. (Emphasis added.)
" The entire Chicago program is set out in a series of papers reproduced in Hearings on H.R. 9509 and
S. 780 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 9oth Cong., ist Sess. 631-831
(1967). The first paper is Stanley, Air Resource Management in the Chicago Metropolitan Area-Planning
for Clean Air. The Chicago legislation (CHncAGo MuNic'AL Cona ch. 17), with additional explanatory
articles, is reproduced in Hearings on S. 78o, pt. 3, at 1901-92 (x967).
" See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
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Code and the New York City Administrative Code reveals basic similarities, it is
pertinent to ask if the distinction between "Air Resource Management" and "Air
Pollution Control" is real or just another example of the mysterious language of
government experts4 I believe that the distinction is real, although it may have
its greatest meaning in legal consequences, rather than in the quality of the air.
Two interlocking legal problems are presented when legislative purpose is defined
in terms of efficient management of air resources rather than elimination of a public
health emergency. The first problem is related to the fundamental question of
whether government can dictate or limit the use of private property in the name of
"greater efficiency for the general good," without having to pay "just compensation"
to the private owner.47 At least one of the frequently used tests of whether police
power regulations have gone so far as to be a compensable government "taking" is
whether the legislation simply restrains conduct harmful to others or whether its
purpose is positive enrichment of the public at the expense of private property s It
has been forcibly argued that legislation of the latter type requires compensation.o
Coerced sharing for the economic benefit of the majority raises serious questions of
an unconstitutional "taking."50 The "promotion of productive capacity" and "efficient
management of resources" indicates that the legislative purpose is collective action
for the general economic good. Government action of that nature may be socially
justified, but compensation may be required for the "donation" of the private property
for the public good.5'
The second legal problem is presented by judicially developed restrictions peculiar
to the enforcement of zoning and planning legislation. The gradual shifting of
the purpose of air pollution legislation from strict public health concepts is further
indicated by the procedure of establishing air quality control regions and air quality
"The elements of an "Air Resource Management" program are: (a) a continuing air-quality moni-
toring system; (b) a current and continuing emission inventory; (c) air-quality goals and standards based
on air-quality criteria; (d) a thorough knowledge and use of the conditions influencing the transport of
air pollutants; (e) urban: planning decisions based on air qualilty as well as other environmental factors;
(f) air pollution control decisions and resulting ordinances based upon air-quality information and relation-
ships between air quality and effects; and (g) air-use plans. PUBLIC H.A. SEvICE MANAGEMENT
PRorsuA z-2. Local "prevention and control" legislation starts at item (f), although in fact it usually
is based upon information developed from techniques equivalent to (a) through (d).
'
7 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "lust Com-
pensation" Law, 8o HAuv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
," Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YAx., L.J. 36, 48 (z964). See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 669 (1887); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
"Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLum. L. Rav. 650, 663-69 (1958).
See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township, 410 Pa. 504, 529, 215 A.2d 597, 61o-x (1966);
Morris County Land Improv. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 555-56, 193 A.2d
232, 241-42 (1963).
11 Michlman, supra note 47.
"See authorities cited in note 49 supra. Various governmental levels have indirectly allowed for
compensation, by providing for tax advantages for the person installing air pollution control equipment.
A study of the subject is being conducted by federal agencies. Hearings on H.R. 95o9 and S. 780 Belore
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 9oth Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (x967).
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standards for each region. 2 This approach has been used to divide New York State
into four regional classifications based upon land use: industrial, commercial,
residential, and rural."s Different air quality standards, generally related to the
possibility of practical accomplishment, are established for each regional classification.
Thus, rural areas are required to have the cleanest air, and industrial areas are
permitted to have dirtier air." While such a classification system projects ultimate
"air quality goals," only the minimum levels common to all regions can be related
to public health. If it is not unhealthy to breathe a certain quality of air in an
industrial region, there is no health justification for requiring a stricter standard in
a commercial area.
It must be recognized, therefore, that "Air Resource Management" is essentially
planning and zoning, and legislation based on that approach may be analyzed and
interpreted on that basis. If that is the result, the legislation will be subjected to the
problems created by pre-existing non-conforming uses,55 variances for "practical
difficulty" or "unnecessary hardship, 56 and the rule that zoning statutes are to be
strictly construed.57
The Public Health Service's recommended legislation, in fact, provides that a
variance may be granted upon a finding that "compliance with the regulation or
order from which a variance is sought would produce serious hardship without a
corresponding benefit or advantage to the people."5" "Wide discretion in weighing
"Air Quality Act of 1967, H§ 107, xo8, 81 Stat. 490. The country has now been divided into
eight "Atmospheric Areas." 33 Fed. Reg. 548 (Jan. 16, 1968).
53NEw YORK STATE AMBIENT AIR QuALITY OBJECaES--CLASSIFICATIONS S=SrEM (N.Y. State Dep't
of Health, x964).
"' "Thus, it is illogical to attempt one over-all set of quality objectives to apply to the entire State.
It cannot be expected that the board can permit air in a clean area-for example, one used
principally for high quality purposes such as recreation-to be degraded to a level that can be
attainable in a highly populated and industrialized area. Nor would it be reasonable to expect
a highly industrialized area to attain economically the level of air quality prevailing in the
presently clean areas."
Id. at S 500.2(c). (Emphasis added.)
"Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Jones v. City of Los Angeles,
211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (193o); People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. io5, io6 N.E.d 34 (952).
GSee generally 2 C. RATaxops, Ta LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 45 (3d ed. 1957).37 440 E. 102d Corp. v. Murdock, 285 N.Y. 298, 34 N.E.2d 329 (1941); Toulouse v. Board of Zoning
Adjustment, 147 Me. 387, 87 A.2d 67o (1952); Modern Builders v. City of Tulsa, 197 Okla. 8o, 168
P.2d 883 (1946). Public Health legislation will generally be liberally construed. See West Bronx Auto
Paint Shop, Inc. v. City of New York, 33 Misc. 2d 29, 223 N.Y.S.2d 984, (196i), aff'd mere., 17
App. Div. 2d 772, 232 N.Y.S.2d 391 (5962), modified, 13 N.Y.S.2d 730, 241 N.Y.S.2d 86x (1963). A
distinction between the constitutional limits of legislative zoning power and police power was em-
phasized in the recent important case of Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (z968).
Recognizing the heavy presumption of constitutional validity that attaches to police power legislation,
basically subjecting it only to a "reasonableness" test, the court held that the zoning power was more
limited and that zoning laws not only must meet standards of reasonableness but they must also be
consistent with land use policy and a "comprehensive plan" worked out for the community as a
whole prior to the adoption of the zoning law.
"Proposed Regulation XVI(C), PUBLIc HErLT SERVICE MANAGEMENT PRooRA sI6. The search
for a "corresponding benefit or advantage to the people" would seem to invite the legal argument that
the regulation requires the payment of "just compensation." See text accompanying notes 47-51 suPra.
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the equities involved in each case"59 is recommended, with the only limit being that
"no variance may permit or authorize the maintenance of a nuisance, or a danger
to public health or safety."60
Planning and zoning can be effective weapons for directing future land use and
conduct. They are not effective to correct a situation that already exists. 1 As a
result, an announced legislative purpose of "Air Resource Management" may inhibit
the imposition of new corrective measures upon activities previously considered to be
lawful.
I
LEGISLATIVE TECHNIQUES: STATE AND LocAL CONTROL LEGISLATION
A. Smoke and Other Emission LimitationS62
Most air pollution legislation has been directed toward limitations upon the
density and opacity of smoke. Because of visibility, even where the control law is
more extensive, most enforcement efforts have been directed against smoke.
The typical urban smoke control law simply limits the density, opacity, and
length of time of smoke emission. 3 The limitations are often not further classified,
and they apply to any equipment used in any operation. Such legislation has been
sustained many times, and there is no question of its general constitutionality."
In addition to smoke limitations, modern legislation may contain specific limita-
a" Id.
"Proposed Regulation' XVI(D), id. The use of the terms "nuisance" and "weighing the equities"
may cause the legislation to be subjected to some of the limitations developed in the common law
private and public nuisance cases.
"'Dom C. McGrath, Director of Metropolitan Area Analysis for the U.S. Dep't of Housing and
Urban Development, has stated:
"Planning and zoning are fundamentally procedures employed by society to make the business
of government, and primarily local units of government, more orderly in response to economic
pressures of urban growth. Until enough people to constitute a critical mass of public opinion
perceive the gravity of the air pollution problem, it is unlikely that needed remedial action will
be taken. When this happens we must remember that neither planning nor zoning, especially
zoning, is a very effective remedial procedure. Both can be very effective remedial procedures, how-
ever, provided that they have the backing of public commitment."
McGrath, Planning and Zoning-Can They Be Made to Work for Clean Air?, in PaocpniNos: Til
TssRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR POLLU-ION 554-57 (Public Health Service Pub. No. x649, 1967).
"Ile Air Quality Act of 1967, § 211(a), 81 Stat. 503, directs the Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare to submit a comprehensive report "on the need for and effect of national
emissioi standards for stationary sources" within two years.
"See, e.g., A.P.C. Reg. § 9.03; CMCAGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 17-23 (1967); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance
428-A-62, § 4.o5o2; Los Angeles County Control District, Regulatioff IV, Rule 5o. The Ringelmann
Smoke Chart is used as a basis for measurement. See note 26 supra.
"Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (x916); City of Rochester v. Maauley-Pien
Milling Co., 199 N.Y. 207 (5g9o). No distinction will be made if the limitations are promulgated as
administrative regulations rather than legislation. West Bronx Auto Paint Shop, Inc. v. City of New
York, 33 Misc. 2d 29, 223 N.Y.S.2d 934 (596i), af'd -ere., 17 App. Div. 2d 772, 232 N.Y.S.2d 391
(x962), modified, 13 N.Y.2d 730, 241 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1963); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Murtagh, aSo
App. Div. 221, I12 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1952).
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tions on the emission of sulfur dioxide, particulate matter," and certain visible con-
taminants, as well as more general prohibitions. The specific limitations (usually
referred to as "emission standards") are detailed and technical and are established
according to classifications based upon the general nature of the equipment used
and its operating size.60 Accordingly, the New York City sulfur dioxide emission
standard applies to equipment used in a manufacturing process,6 7 and the standards
for particulate matter are established according to whether the equipment is refuse
burning equipment, fuel burning equipment, or manufacturing process equipment,
and according to the capacity rating and heat input of fuel burning equipment and
the process weight per hour of the manufacturing equipment.68 The basis for
establishing various classifications determined by the nature and size of the equip-
ment used is obvious, for it is one of the most direct ways of determining the char-
acteristics and amount of pollution from an installation. Such classifications have
been recognized as valid.6"
The establishment of emission standards is considered by many to represent the
ideal legislative approach, as it theoretically leaves to the owner's discretion the
precise type of equipment or fuel to be used. This is the general approach used by
the federal government to limit emission from automobiles.70
Many legislative and administrative bodies, however, have long recognized that
the bare setting of emission standards was not sufficient, and that fuels and equip-
ment should be directly regulated. In enacting Local Law 14,'1 New York City
recognized and followed this approach. Among the reasons cited were that there
were too many smokestacks to permit constant observation for visible smoke viola-
tions, and that no practical scientific equipment was available which was capable of
being placed and maintained in every smokestack to constantly record the amounts
of invisible gases or particles being emitted.72 In any event, a strict emission standard
has the indirect result of requiring a change in either equipment or fuel in order
to meet the standard,73 for the emission must depend upon what substance goes in
and what is done to it.
Particularly in New York, the seeming uncertainty permitted by smoke emission
"Defined as "Any liquid, other than water, or any solid which is so finely divided as to be capable
of becoming wind-blown or being suspended in air." See N.Y. CITy ADmrN. CODE § 892-2.0 (Supp. 1967).
"See A COMPILATION OF SELECTED AIR PoLLUTIoN EMISSION CONTROL REGULATIONS AND ORDINANCES
(Public Health Service Pub. No. A65-34, 1965).
6 A.P.C. Reg. § 9.07.
"Id. § 9.09.
"City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., x99 N.Y. 207 (i91o); Ballentine v. Nester, 350
Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942).
"'Air Quality Act of 1967, §§ 201-12, 81 Stat. 499. For the initial regulations, see 31 Fed. Reg.
5170 (1966).
See note 9 supra.
71 REPORT OF Naw YORK CrrY COUNCIL CoMaoITzE ON BUI.DINGS ON INTRo. No. 49 (N.Y. City
Record, at 2621).
" This obvious result was particularly recognized in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440 (596o), and Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (i916).
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standards alone has enabled some courts, engaged in determining "reasonableness"
for due process purposes, to indulge in amateur engineering analyses and declare
that the statute must be applied "reasonably" to avoid compelling an "impossible" or
"impractical" result or punishment for an "unavoidable necessity." Stretching the
concept of "reasonableness" beyond an inquiry into whether the exercise of the police
power is arbitrary to whether application of the statute appears "fair" or "practical"
in a particular case, is an abandonment of the principles of judicial restraint in favor
of flexible private nuisance concepts.
The first of these "rule of reason" cases involved an early smoke control statute
which forbade the emission of "any smoke or gas." 4 The extreme prohibition led
the court into a simplified engineering analysis that took judicial notice of the
"fact" that no fire could be burned without either smoke or gas. The analysis led
to the conclusion that "[ilt cannot be supposed that the legislature intended to require
the impossible, or to close every furnace in our city for the promotion of a better
atmosphere."' 5
If the court had been content with the relatively narrow issue of literal im-
possibility of compliance, the case would have been unimportant, as the statute was
soon amended to prevent "dense smoke." The court, however, went further and
expounded:
It appears further that there is not known any device that can accomplish the
absolute combustion of smoke, and that the defendant has adopted a standard
pattern of construction; nor does it appear that there is any better device, of tested
standing in commercial use, that the defendant has omitted to avail itself of.70
The court's general attitude can be observed from the following dicta, sure to
bring a sad smile to the face of today's city dwellers:
We have been so accustomed until lately to the clear atmosphere of our city, as to
regard the escape of smoke as constituting in itself a nuisance, forgetting that this
is one of but few manufacturing centers where the pall of smoke is not accepted as
a necessary incident.77
The case was followed by People v'. New York Central & H.RR. Co.," which
dismissed a conviction for the issuance of dense smoke on the ground that the
prosecution had shown no evidence of an excess of smoke over that "necessary" for
operation and no evidence that any other method could produce less smoke.
In People v. New York Edison Co.," the court acknowledged that smoke control
was a proper area for restrictive legislation, but it held:
T
'Dep't of Health v. Philip & William Ebling Brewing Co., 38 Misc. 537, 78 N.Y.S. 13 (1902). But
see Ex Pare Junqua, zo Cal. App. 602, 103 P. 159 (909).
s 38 Misc. at 540, 78 N.Y.S. at x5.
.138 Misc. at 538, 78 N.Y.S. at 14.
T138 Milsc. at 54r, 78 N.Y.S. at 16.
TS z59 App. Div. 329, 144 N.Y.S. 699 (190x).
-t 159 App. Div. 786, 144 N.Y.S. 707 (1913).
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The section should have a reasonable construction which would preclude a con-
viction for a mere accidental or occasional momentary discharge of dense smoke,
but which would insure the prevention of a continuous discharge or a discharge at
intervals of large volumes of smoke, such as is caused by the use of soft coal.80
The suggestion of a defense of "impossibility" or "unavoidable momentary dis-
charge" lay dormant from 1913 until the 1939 case of People v. Cunard White Star,
Ltd."' That case held the dense smoke emission statute to be an unreasonable ob-
struction to foreign commerce when applied to a steamship, unless "its scope is limited
to prohibition of the discharge of smoke, avoidable by the use of modern appliances
and of methods which are practicable."'82
The facts showed that the S.S. Queen Mary was equipped with modern
appliances, but that dense smoke occurred when cold boilers were being started and
when demands for steam fluctuated as the ship was entering or leaving port. The
prosecution claimed that it was no defense that the steamship was constructed and
operated so as to make continued violations a "necessary incident" to the defendant's
business. The court answered as follows:
That might be true if construction or operation is improper or if change there were
practical. Here, however, there is no suggestion that either operation or construction
is not in conformity with the highest standards or that occasional emission of
smoke, for a few minutes on the day a vessel enters or leaves port, could be
avoided by change which would not unreasonably obstruct the operation of the
steamshipPm
The key phrase, of course, is "change which would not unreasonably obstruct
the operation." The dissent claimed that while the defendant's practice of firing
the boilers was cheaper, dense smoke could be avoided by firing one boiler at a time.
In People v. Murray,"' the defendant claimed that everything reasonably possible
was being done to control smoke at its power plant and that occasional dense smoke
was unavoidable, especially when tests of coal were being conducted. 5 The court
found, however, that regular operations could be maintained without dense smoke;
and as to the "unavoidable necessity" of boiler tests, it stated:
I cannot subscribe to this contention. If the generation of dense smoke by all the
power and industrial plants in the City of New York when making tests of
coal comes within the category of unavoidable smoke, then we are indeed giving
legal sanction to a smoke condition which would be a menace to the health and
welfare of the inhabitants of the city. In this situation, economy and efficiency
should be subordinated to the general welfare.... It would seem reasonable to
expect that coal tests could be made outside of New York City under conditions
so x59 App. Div. 795, 144 N.Y.S. at 74.
81280 N.Y. 413 (1939).
B*Id. at 417.
" [d. at 420.
174 Misc. 251, 19 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1940).
Approximately twelve weeks per year were allegedly used for testing coal.
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which duplicate those at defendant's plant. At any rate it rests with science to
devise satisfactory and efficient methods of testing coal which do not affect the
general health.86
The court then went on to limit the "unavoidable" concept to instances not based
upon economy or efficiency, but caused by specific reasons beyond the defendant's
control.
In People v. Long Island RR.,87 a claim of "unavoidable discharge" was offered
when a coal strike cut off the regular source of low volatile coal and the defendant
used reserves of high volatile coal, causing dense smoke. The court rejected the
defense on the ground that low volatile coal could be purchased elsewhere, and held
that the defense only applied to a momentary discharge and not to a continuing
situation.
A series of more recent New York cases indicates a possible swing back toward
the theory that if the installation contains properly operated "modern" control
equipment and smoke of a prohibited density nevertheless results, then its emission
is "unavoidable" and safe from prosecution8 8
In People v. Savage,"0 the issue involved the huge Donner-Hanna coke plant in
Buffalo. The court relied upon the claim of "unavoidable necessity" as interpreted
by the Cunard White Star case and declared:
It appears from the evidence that the method of storing its coal supply and the
precautions taken by the Donner-Hanna plant to eliminate or prevent dust from
the coal pile are exceptional in the industry and greatly beyond what is done in
most plants.
Also that all its coal and coke piles, ovens, cars, quenchers, buildings, structures,
equipment and materials, and methods of care and operation is modern up-to-date
and fully in accord with the best coke plants in the coke industry throughout the
United States.
The testimony justifies a finding that there is no known method, device or
apparatus known to the industry or employed in any other plant in the United
States to eliminate or reduce smoke, dust and fumes, or to alleviate this condition,
which is not employed and in use at the Donner-Hanna plant, and that its operation,
methods and procedures are in accord with the best operational methods employed
by the best plants in the industry. 0°
The court held the Buffalo dense smoke statute unconstitutional when applied
to the Donner-Hanna plant.
A defense that consists mainly of "My plant is as good or better than anyone
as 174 Misc. at 26o-6i, 19 N.Y.S. 2d at 9o-ir.S731 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1941).
" People v. Oswald, I Misc. 2d 726, 116 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1952); People v. Savage, x Misc. 2d 337, 148
N.Y.S.2d z9x, afl'd mem., 309 N.Y. 941, 132 N.E.2d 313 (1955); People v. Peterson, 31 Misc. 2d 738,
226 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1961).
so I Misc. 2d 337, 148 N.Y.S.2d i9i, afd mere., 309 N.Y. 941, 132 N.E.2d 313 (955). See note
14 supra and accompanying text.
OD I Misc. 2d at 340, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
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else's plant" should be inadequate in the face of a flat prohibition in a public health
statute. Certainly the engineering evaluation of equipment is more a function of
the legislature than the courts. It is both conceivable and understandable for one
city to require a standard which is stricter than other cities and to require its
citizens to do better than those in cities that appear to care or need less.
State v. Mundet Cork Corp.1 did not reject the theory of "unavoidable neces-
sity" but held that where laboratory experiments had indicated success, the scientific
techniques must be actually attempted and have failed before a claim of "impossi-
bility" or "unavoidable necessity" can be considered. Several cases have flatly rejected
the defense of "unavoidable necessity."92 As explained in the early case of Moses v.
United States:93
The defendant offered evidence tending to show that they had attached to their
furnace, at the time, the best known smoke-consuming appliance; but that neither
it nor any other, then known, would prevent the emission of such smoke for a
brief period upon each occasion that fire might be started, or the furnaces "cooled,"
or "raked down," provided that soft bituminous coal be the fuel consumed.
That there may be no smoke-consuming appliances that will under all cir-
cumstances, prevent the nuisance, is not a matter of relevance. The facts concern-
ing them were presumably within the knowledge of Congress also when it took
action; and no provision has been made for their use. The use of smokeless fuel
instead may have been expressly contemplated.
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,94 involved a fact situation similar in
many ways to that in the Cunard White Star case. The shipowner sought to enjoin
enforcement of Detroit's smoke emission ordinance. The ship operated pursuant to
a federal coast guard certificate which specified and approved the ship's equipment
for use on navigable waters. The ship used hand-fired boilers, which, when cleaned,
emitted smoke in violation of the Detroit ordinance. In order to meet Detroit's
smoke standard, structural alterations were necessary and a different type of boiler had
to be installed.
The court found the elimination of air pollution to be a valid purpose for the
exercise of a police power determined by Congress to be the primary responsibility
of state and local governments. It held that since the vessel was not unconditionally
excluded from the Port of Detroit, there was no undue burden upon interstate com-
merce or federal pre-emption of the field. The defense of "unavoidable necessity"
91 State v. Mundet Cork Corp., 8 N.J. 359, 86 A.2d i, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 819 (1952).
"Moses v. United States, 16 App. D.C. 428 (i9oo); People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich.
471 , 46 N.W. 735 (189o); Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d (1942). The recent case of
Dep't of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 242 A.2d 21, 36 (N.J. Super. 1968) upholding recent
New Jersey legislation, stated: "We hold that the doctrine of unavoidable necessity is not available to
defendant and is not viable in the context of the Air Pollution Code."
08 16 App. Div. 428, 440 (19oo).
ot 362 U.S. 440 (196o).
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was not even discussed, although the vessel's boilers had to be completely replaced.
As expressed by the Michigan court in the same case: "All it costs is money."0 5
Of course, legislation may itself allow a defense equivalent to "impossibility" or
"unavoidable necessity." The Air Quality Act of 1967 establishes the following
judicial standards in an abatement action:
The court, giving due consideration to the practicability of complying with such
standards as may be applicable and to the physical and economic feasibility of
securing abatement of any pollution proved, shall have jurisdiction to enter such
judgment, and orders enforcing such judgment, as the public interest and the
equities of the case may require. 96
The administrative enforcement proceedings of the New York State law permit
similar defenses of "impossibility, impracticability or financial inability. '97
While the technique of controlling air pollution by emission standards alone may
face the difficulties of an occasional defense of "impossibility" or "unavoidable
necessity," the cases sustaining such defenses violate traditional principles of judicial
restraint. In the absence of a legislative provision allowing such extremely flexible
defenses, the courts should refrain from challenging the technical foundations for
the legislative action. It would nevertheless appear desirable for legislation to
combine emission standards with more particular equipment requirements so as
to avoid judicial relaxation on the grounds that the equipment in use seems to be
the best commercially available.
B. Operating Certificates as a Supervisory Technique: Regulation of Equipment
Perhaps the dominant technique of the 1966 New York City law is the regulation
and supervision of equipment by the issuance of operating certificates. Under the
previous law, most new construction required the filing of plans and a permit before
installation and issuance of an operating certificate before operation. 8 Permit
systems have been widely used to assure that new construction incorporates the
best technical advances and there would appear to be little constitutional question
as to the general use of this control technique.99
The 1966 New York City law considerably extended the system, by requiring
that much existing fuel burning equipment, most existing refuse burning equipment,
all existing manufacturing processes emitting a sulfur compound, and certain port-
able equipment, obtain operating certificates in compliance with various time
95355 Mich. 227, 234, 93 N.W.2d 888, 892 (1959).
"Air Quality Act of 1967, S io8(h), 81 Star. 496.
"'New York Public Health Law S 1282(3). The "hardship" variance provisions of the Public Health
Service's recommended legislation would seem to allow the same type of defense. See text accompanying
note 58 supra.
"N.Y. CITy ADMiN. Cona § 892°4.0 (Supp. 1967); A.P.C. Reg. H3 5.1x, 5.17. In many instances
technical criteria detailing the minimum requirements for the granting of installation permits were issued.
A.P.C. Reg. § 511(b).
"See Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (i956).
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deadlines. 00 In the case of existing fuel burning and refuse burning equipment,
certain improvements are specifically required before an operating certificate will be
issued, and in all cases, the equipment must incorporate the best advances in the
art of air pollution control.
It is, of course, pertinent to examine the constitutionality of requiring lawfully
operated equipment to be upgraded in order to continue to operate lawfully.
In the leading case of Hadacheck v. Los Angeles,10' the ordinance in question
prohibited the operation of any brickyard within certain limits of Los Angeles. The
defendant had begun brickmaking prior to enactment of the ordinance on land
that had not then been a part of the city. The area later became predominantly
residential and was annexed to the city. The ordinance was based upon the city's
power to halt the emission of fumes, smoke, soot, steam and dust resulting from the
brickmaking. Referring to the police power, the Supreme Court declared:
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential powers
of government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its
exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence
precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest can-
not be asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. [Citation omitted.]
To so hold would preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive
conditions. There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in
the way they must yield to the good of the community 0 2
In Health Department v. The Rector etc. of Trinity Church,' legislation re-
quired running water to be made available on each floor of a tenement house. The
argument was made that the requirement could not legally apply to pre-existing
buildings. The court rejected the argument and held:
Anyone in a crowded city who desires to erect a building is subject at every turn
almost to the exactions of the law in regard to provisions for health, for safety
from fire and for other purposes. He is not permitted to build of certain materials
within certain districts because though the materials may be inexpensive they are
inflammable, and he must build in a certain manner ... in carrying out all these
various acts the owner is subjected to an expense much greater than would have
been necessary to have completed his building if not compelled to complete it in
the manner, of the materials and under the circumstances prescribed by various
acts of the legislature.... I do not see that the principle is substantially altered
where the case is one of an existing building and it is to be subjected to certain
alterations for the purpose of rendering it either less exposed to the danger from
fires or its occupants more secure from disease. 10 4
t0 N.Y. Crry Aumu. CODE S§ 892-4.2, 4.3 (modified and amended in z968), 4.4, 4.5 (Supp. 1967).
lot 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
"'Id. at 410. (Emphasis added.) See also People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 46
N.W. 735 (1890).
13 145 N.Y. 32 (1895).
'Id. at 44-45-
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The principle has been recently endorsed as follows:
It is clearly settled that "in no case does the owner of property acquire immunity
against the exercise of the police power because he constructed it in full compli-
ance with existing laws.' 10 5
While it would therefore appear to be settled that a challenge to the "retro-
active" provisions of the New York City law on the grounds of prior lawful opera-
tion would be unsuccessful, "Air Resource Management" legislation containing such
provisions would be vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability exists because the latter
is based upon planning to pre-existing, non-conforming uses which would seem to
prevent "retroactive" correction or forced upgrading of equipment 0 0
Naturally any required upgrading of equipment will result in an owner's expendi-
ture of funds. Since the legislature can inquire into the matter of prospective costs,
the usual rule is that questions of cost are left by the courts to legislative discretion.'
07
Some cases have stated in dicta, however, that the cost of improvements required by
legislation must be "reasonable." In the Trinity Church case, the court, after holding
that the law applied to pre-existing buildings, proposed:
In both cases the object must be within some of the acknowledged purposes of the
police power and such purpose must be possible of accomplishment at some reason-
able cost, regard being had to all the surrounding circumstances.
108
This reference to "reasonable cost" has been recently repeated by the New York
Court of Appeals.'0 9 Such references are another instance of confusing the use of the
word "reasonable" in the due process test of arbitrariness, with its application in
private nuisance cases.
In the case of Adamec v. Post,"' the New York Court of Appeals followed the
retroactivity principle of the Trinity Church case, but went on to reject the "cost"
challenge as follows:
The imposition of the cost of the required alterations as a condition of the con-
tinued use of antiquated buildings for multiple dwellings may cause hardship to
the plaintiffs and other owners of "old law tenements" but, in a proper case, the
Legislature has the power to enact provisions reasonably calculated to promote the
common good even though the result be hardship to the individual....
Certainly the proportion of cost of the alteration to the assessed or even market
value of the old law tenement can be no criterion of whether the Legislature has
acted reasonably in requiring the alteration....
1 0 5Engelshar v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y.2d 370, 375, 157 N.E.2d 626, 628, x8o N.Y.S.2d 640, 643, cert. denied,
36o U.S. 902 (1959). See also Dankner v. City of New York, 20 Misc. 2d 557, 194 N.Y.S.2d 975 (x959).
esSee cases cited note 55 supra.
1"Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (19x6); Sittner v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 834,
384 P.2d 859 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (196o).
108 145 N.Y. at 45. (Emphasis added.)
"
9 Engelshar v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y.2d 370, 157 N.E.2d 626, 184 N.Y.S.2d 640, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902
(1959).110 273 N.Y. 250 (1937).
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Because the State has tolerated slum dwellings in the past it is not precluded
from taking appropriate steps to end them in the future."11
The only time that the cost of complying with public health legislation should be
a factor for judicial consideration is when standards are so completely arbitrary
and oppressive as to be a patent legislative disguise for requiring absolute termina-
tion of the basic activity.L12  The fact that economic hardship in a particular in-
stance may cause a termination of activity will not sustain a constitutional chal-
lenge.1
3
When the question was recently raised by a municipality contesting a water
pollution classification, the New York Court of Appeals declared:
Appellants contend that if the fiscal and economic aspects of water purification
cannot properly be raised at the time of classification, then they can never influence
a particular classification, since the municipality is legally bound to abide by the
classification made, subject only to such deferment as the Board may allow. The
obvious answer to this is that the Legislature well knew that a comprehensive
water purification program would impose a financial burden upon the municipali-
ties of the State, but determined, by enacting the Pollution Control Act, that the
pressing need for water purification outweighed any financial hardships incident
thereto.114
As long as the legislature studies the costs involved and does not expressly provide
for the issue to be considered in a particular case, a reopening of the inquiry by a
court would appear to be an unjustified interference with the legislative power." 5
Requirements for operating certificates for existing equipment necessarily in-
volve numerous classifications. These classifications must meet the constitutional
requirements of the equal protection clause. Separate classifications are established in
New York City for fuel burning equipment using residual fuel oil, fuel burning
equipment using coal, refuse burning equipment and manufacturing equipment
emitting sulfur compounds. Each of the classifications is based either on the use
of the equipment, the fuel used in the equipment, or the nature of the emission.
The St. Louis ordinance challenged in Ballentine v. Nester,"' approached that
city's smoke problem by regulating the kinds of coal that could be used and the
types of furnaces in which certain coals could be burned. The court maintained:
We hold that as Section 5340, supra, classified coal to be used according to its ash,
sulfur, and volatile contents, and the type of furnace in which these various classi-
... Id. at 259-6o.
1 1 2Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (894).
11 Sittner v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 834, 384 P.2d 859 (1963). In State v. Mundet Cork Corp., 8 N.J.
359, 86 A.2d r, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 819 (1952), the court's inquiry was as to wkether the expense of
compliance was "insuperable."
""'Town of Waterford v. Water Pollution Control Board, 5 N.Y.2d 17r, 18o, 156 N.E.2d 427, 431,
182 N.Y.S.2d 785, 791 (1959).
115 See text accompanying notes 96, 97 supra. A court will, however, always have open to it the
question of whether the legislation constitutes a "taking" without just compensation.
%is 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942).
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fications of coal may be burned bears a reasonable relation to the dense smoke
nuisance, the ordinance is not an arbitrary classification as it applies equally to
all users of coal of the same classification."17
Accordingly, there would appear to be little chance of a successful challenge
to operating certificate requirements such as those in New York City, on the basis
of a denial of equal protection of the law.
C. Regulation of Fuels
Among the control techniques receiving the most attention are direct limitations
upon the kind and nature of fuels permitted to be burned, even in otherwise cor-
rectly operated equipment' 1
The first known direct limitations upon fuel use were, as might be expected, limi-
tations on the use of various coals. In 1895, the then city of Brooklyn passed a statute
which provided, in part:
No factory, engine-room or electrical station shall use what is known as soft coal
for fuel in the furnaces of such factories, engine-room or electrical station within
a radius of four miles of the city hall in the city of Brooklyn....P9
It was quickly concluded that the statute was a valid exercise of the police power,
and a conviction for violation was upheld. 2 The statute was later held to prevent
the use of a mixture containing only twenty per cent soft coal regardless of whether
the mixture would burn without smoke.' 2'
The main thrust of the pioneering St. Louis legislation consisted of direct limita-
tions on the volatile matter, sulfur, and ash contents of coal, as well as limitations
upon the type of equipment to be used. In Ballentine v. Nester, the constitutional
challenge was based upon a claim that the statute was not a bona fide health regula-
tion because it regulated the manner of burning, rather than the gases or particles
emitted.'2 In upholding the statute, the court declared:
There can be no doubt that under the above sections that the legislative depart-
ment of the City of St. Louis has the power to abate the smoke nuisance in the city
by any reasonable method. To accomplish that object, it enacted Section 5340,
supra. This section sought to obtain that object by regulating the kind of coal
that can be burned in that city.... The public policy or wisdom of a regulation
in regard to the use of soft coal is for the legislature to determine and not the
"
17 Id. at 72, x64 S.V.2d at 383.
11. N.Y. CITY ADMm. CODE § 893-1.0(a) (Supp. 1967); New York State Rules and Regulations, Title
xo (Health), Chapter IV, Subchapter A, Part 200 (effective April x8, x968); Los Angeles County Air
Pollution Control District, Regulation IV, Rules 62, 62.1; St. Louis, Mo., Ordnance 5o63, § xz(a).
... Ch. 322, Laws of 1895, City of Brooklyn, New York.
1 0 City of Brooklyn v. Nassau Electric R.R., 44 App. Div. 462, 61 N.Y. 33 (1899).
' City of New York v. H.W. Jobns-Manville Co., 89 App. Div. 449, 85 N.Y.S. 757 (1903).
... For proof of the versatility of the legal profession, see Oswald v. Christy, 112 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1952),
where a challenge to an emission standard system was based upon the statute's failure to directly regulate
the fuel and manner of burning.
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courts .... The courts have no power to determine the merits of conflicting
theories, nor to declare that a particular method of advancing and protecting the
public is superior or likely to insure greater safety or better protection than others.m
In State v. Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry.,'- the challenge was to a Minneapolis
ordinance limiting the volatile content of coal used in certain types of engines. The
limitation effectively prohibited the use of soft coal in those engines. The court
upheld the statute and stated:
A legislative requirement that locomotives shall burn coal other than the kind that
produces the smoke nuisance is directly and substantially related to the prevention
of annoyance and discomfort incident to dense smoke. The public policy or wisdom
of such a prohibition is for the Legislature to determine.
The courts cannot undertake to decide whether the means adopted by the
Legislature are the only means, or even the best means, possible to attain the end
sought....
Counsel for defendant urges that careful firing in locomotives will prevent the
nuisance. Existing conditions suggest strongly either that such is not the fact, or
that careful firing cannot, in general practice, be obtained.
125
The 1966 New York City law prohibits the burning of soft coal for heating pur-
poses and permits other uses of soft coal (primarily for the generation of steam and
electricity) only if particulate control equipment of a certified ninety-nine per cent
efficiency is installed. 28
In view of the many instances of judicial recognition of the relationship between
bituminous coal and air pollution and the obvious basis for the separate classifications
of soft coal used for space heating and soft coal used for other purposes, a constitu-
tional challenge to New York's restrictions on the use of bituminous coal would
appear to have little chance of success.
Another controversial provision of the New York City law established a new
schedule of limitations upon the sulfur content of coal and residual fuel oi1. 2  The
limits resulted primarily from a study of serious health episodes in New York City
and elsewhere
2 s
Since both coal and oil vary in natural sulfur content, and since it is obvious
that other fuels can be substituted for high sulfur fuel oil and high sulfur coal,
the primary issue involved in the application of the sulfur limitations is economics.
High sulfur residual fuel oil and high sulfur coal command the cheapest price
12 350 Mo. 58, 70, x64 S.W.2d 378, 382 (1942).
12, 14 Minn. 122, 13o N.W. 545 (19x).
12 Id. at 127-28, 13o NV. at 547.
28N.Y. CiTY ADmiN. CODE § 893-2.0 (Supp. 1967). Previous law limited the volatile content of
coal used in mechanically fed equipment not equipped with a combustion controller. See People v.
Prince Jagendorf Greene, Inc., 7 N.Y.2d 42, x63 N.E.2d 323, N.Y.S.2d 498 (959).
.. N.Y. CITY ADms. CODE § 893-I.o(a) (Supp. 1967).
26s Interim report of New York City Council Special Committee, in Hearings on S. 780, pt. 3, at
1500.
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among today's commonly used fuels. Fuel oil can be further refined so as to
reduce the sulfur content; the question is solely one of competition.
129
Some aspects of damage from sulfur were recognized in the following 1952 dicta:
Bituminous coal contains from one percent to two percent of sulfur, most of which
is evolved in the gaseous form but some is found in the soot. Its sticky nature
causes it to adhere tenuously to objects with which it comes into contact and since
it usually contains free sulfuric acids, it has a destructive action upon stone, fabrics,
metals and vegetation apart from the widespread dirt and discoloration which it
causes. Aside from the damage it causes, it does in addition entail greatly increased
expense in general maintenance, washing, cleaning and artificial lighting. These
damages are further made visible when we note the contrast between gardens main-
tained in the city with those in the country.130
The fact that many experiments are now being conducted for methods of
removing sulfur dioxide from the stack 18 led to a novel provision in the New York
City law. It permits an exemption from the sulfur limitations for an operator whose
equipment has control apparatus capable of continuously preventing the emission
of sulfur dioxide greater than would be the result of the direct sulfur content
limitations. 182 Continuous monitoring equipment and other detailed safeguards
are required. This alternative was established even though no existing method was
considered economically feasible for commercial operation in this country. Systems
for stack gas removal are in limited operation in England and Germany and detailed
scientific and mechanical information is available. This exemption provision was
obviously designed to stimulate industry into channeling research and development
eeforts toward new methods of air pollution control. There would seem to be no
legal objection to this type of legislation since it is in the form of a permissive
exemption, and the standards required are specifically described.
Despite the many technical advances that can be expected as attention to the
problem of air pollution increases, the basic control technique of directly limiting
the type or content of fuels will probably dominate for many years.
D. Regulation of Equipment Operators
The New York City law requires instruction for all operators of fuel burning
equipment using residual oil and all operators of refuse burning equipment. 88 The
completion of a course of instructions in air pollution control techniques is required
and a certificate evidencing completion of the course is required to be posted adjacent
to the equipment. The course of instruction may be maintained by educational insti-
1291d. at 1522-23.
... People v. Consolidated Edison Co., 1x6 N.Y.S.2d 555, 560 (1952).
"'Interim report of the New York City Council Special Committee, in Hearings on S. 780, Pt. 3, at
1523•
x" N.Y. Cnry ADMIN. CODE §§ 893-I-o(b)-(e) (Supp. 1967).
Ia d. S 896"Ii.O.
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tutions, industry or labor organizations; but the course must be approved by the
City's administering agency.
Since the competence and knowledge of operators of equipment directly related
to air pollution affect the control of air pollution, the constitutionality of -requiring
a program of instruction appears certain. As stated in Wasmuth v. Allen :' "The
imposition of a new requirement for the continued practice of a profession previ-
ously carried on without the need of such requirements does not violate the Consti-
tution."
As other statutory provisions require the installation of new devices for residual
oil burning equipment and refuse burning equipment, the requirement that operators
receive instruction in the use and purpose of this equipment is related to the "contin-
uing regulation and correction" envisaged by New York City's control program 8 5
E. Direct Prohibition of Specific Activities
The complete prohibition of an activity detrimental to the public health has long
been a standard legislative technique' 6 New York City, for example, has long-
standing regulations banning such business activities as the burning of bones and the
skinning of animals. 3 7
The direct abatement of a particular activity is subject to the same constitutional
limitations as other air pollution control techniques. 38  The legislation may be
general, such as a complete ban of all open burning activities," 9 or may have reference
to a specific industry. 40 Legislative intention to flatly prohibit an activity should be
clear and specific. An attempt to achieve the same object, by establishing performance
standards not truly designed to be achieved, will inevitably involve a defense of "im-
possibility."'141
F. Enforcement Techniques
The enforcement techniques utilized by state and local legislation are as varied
as the methods of creating air pollution. Criminal sanctions are the most frequently
used enforcement approach with violation of any provision of the law or regula-
134 14 N.Y.2d 391, 398, 2oo N.E.2d 756, 759-6o, 252 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (964).
... West Bronx Auto Paint Shop, Inc. v. City of New York, 33 Misc. 2d 29, 223 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1961),
aff'd mem., 17 App. Div. 2d 772, 232 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1962), modified, 13 N.Y.2d 730, 241 N.Y.S,2d
861 (1963).
""See 3 BLAcKsroNE, C0 MIENTA.IES 215 (i6th ed. I825).
"" N.Y. CITY HEALTH CODE § 135.21.
"'Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). See aho Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394
(1915).
:" N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § C19-148.o (Supp. 1967); CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 17-30, 17-31
(1967); PUBLIC HEaLTH SERVICE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 99-00. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Toth, 189 Pa.
Super. 552, 152 A.2d 284 (1959); Shearing v. City of Rochester, 51 Misc. 2d 436, 273 N.Y.S.2d 464
(1966).
"'See Highway ioo Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 96 N.W.2d 85 (I959)
(burning of junked automobiles).
"' See text accompanying notes 74-90 supra.
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dons being a misdemeanor or an offense for which criminal penalties may be im-
posed in a criminal court proceeding.1' While the time-honored method of abating
a nuisance is the securing of a civil injunction, most legislatures have apparently
determined that such a procedure is not fast enough for effective air pollution
control43
Although criminal sanctions are used, criminal intent is not necessary for con-
viction. As described in People v. Consolidated Edison Co.:'44
In an action as the present one, good faith is no defense. The criminal intent of
mens rea essential to a conviction in the case of true crimes need neither be
alleged or proven with respect to violations of municipal ordinances which forbid
the commission of certain acts as contrary to the general welfare and make them
malum prohibitum. Proof or admission of the doing of the forbidden thing,
regardless of intent, good faith or wilfulness, must bring a conviction.
Questions of evidence in air pollution control enforcement cases are no different
than those presented in any other case.' 45 The use of mechanical equipment to
measure smoke only goes to the weight of the evidence, and electronic smoke indi-
cator records may in one case be insufficient to overcome the observations of in-
spectors,146 while in another case they may be suffident.147
In addition to usual enforcement procedure, summary powers to shut down
offending equipment may be granted, primarily to deal with emergency situations. 148
Many statutes employ initial administrative enforcement techniques 49 The use
of a permit requirement system is the most typical administrative enforcement
method. Final enforcement, of course, must rest with the courts in either criminal
or civil injunctive proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The varied and technical nature of air pollution has caused legislatures to adopt
multiple and varying legal techniques in an attempt to achieve realistic control.
Experience has shown that most carefully drafted public health related control
techniques are within the legal boundaries established by the U.S. Constitution.
142 N.Y. CrrY ADMiN. CODE § 894-3.0 (Supp. 1967); CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 17-79 (x967); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24253, 24277-82 (West 1967).
""
3 For the Los Angeles, California experience, see Kennedy, The Mechanics ol Legislative and Regu-
latory Action, in PRocEEDINGs: NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON Am PoLU.ToN 306 (Public Health Service
Pub. No. 1022, 1962). But see Leone v. Paris, 43 Misc. 2d 442, 251 N.Y.S.2d 277 (z964), modified,
24 App. Div. 2d 508, 261 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1965) (water pollution).
14 116 N.Y.S.2d 555, 560 (1952).
.14"See People v. Prince Jagen'dorf Greene, Inc., 7 N.Y.2d 42, 163 N.E.2d 325, x94 N.Y.S.2d 498
(X959).
* ' See, e.g., People v. Murray, 174 Misc. 250, 59 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1940).
1T See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Butler Bros., 350 Ill. App. 550, 113 N.E.ad 210 (x953).
4 See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 892-6.o (Supp. 1967); CHICAGO MUNICIPAL COoE §§ 17-75, 17.76
(x967).
"9E.g., N.Y. Stat: Public Health Law § 1282; Air Quality Act of x967, § 1o8, 81 Stat. 491.
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The legal tools are available for the job that has to be done, although no one
could honestly claim that effective air pollution control has been achieved. Modern
and comprehensive state and local prevention and control statutes are relatively new,
and their economically harsh effects have deterred dynamic enforcement. The
frustrations incident to enforcement should not, however, cause a change of direction
away from the present control techniques to the more remote aims of planning
and zoning legislation. Centralized desires for efficient utilization and management
of resources are tightly circumscribed by the protections of the free enterprise system
guaranteed by the Constitution. The efficiencies of "cost-effectiveness analyses"'150 as
interpreted by government, cannot be imposed upon private property without just
compensation.
Air pollution is a current public health problem. The need for elimination of
that problem now provides a sound constitutional basis for corrective legislation.
The need for future land-use planning, no matter how genuine, should not be allowed
to dominate the purposes and directions of state and local legislative efforts to prevent
and control air pollution at its source.
1" Air Quality Act of x967, S 1o(c), 81 Stat. 491.
